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Abstract
This paper provides an insight into the underlying factors involved in potential cerebral palsy and/or
shoulder dystocia claims. The research was undertaken to identify the root causes of 37 cases of birth
asphyxia in term infants severe enough to warrant admission to neonatal care units in the north-west of
England between 2001 and 2002. All available staff (n ¼ 93) providing care during critical periods were
interviewed by the author using the cognitive interviewing technique. These included 81 midwives, two
consultant obstetricians, eight registrars and two senior house officers. An expert panel consisting of
consultant obstetricians, midwives, a consultant neonatologist and the researcher applied the Bolam test
to identify instances where care had been substandard and injury caused as a result. Although the cases
were often complex, covering more than one shift and over more than one stage of labour, the most
dangerous time appeared to be during the night shift (19 cases, 51%), followed by the evening shift (13
cases, 35%) and then the day shift (five cases, 14%). The main problems include: failure to respond
appropriately to signs of fetal hypoxia (26 cases, 70%); undiagnosed obstruction (22 cases, 59%), which
was broken down into failure to identify cephalopelvic disproportion (13 cases, 35%); and shoulder
dystocia (nine cases, 24%). Delayed resuscitation of the infant occurred in 26 cases (80%), and in 18 cases
(49%) there was excessive and inappropriate use of Syntocinon. All cases involved human error, either
through a delay or failure to take action, or taking inappropriate action. However, these were all
underpinned and perpetuated by system and cultural errors present in the labour wards, such as allowing
unsupported and inexperienced personnel to work in a position for which they lacked the necessary skill
and experience. This was perpetuated by the customary practice of using unsupervised junior medical staff
in a first on-call position for complications, and also of failing to sustain safe midwifery staffing levels. This
in turn prevented support for more inexperienced staff. Consequently, when inexperienced midwives and
obstetricians were left unsupervised in charge of complicated cases, it created accidents waiting to
happen. When unsupervised and inexperienced paediatricians attended the birth of an asphyxiated infant,
the child’s condition deteriorated further when they were unable to resuscitate it. If such system and
cultural errors as these are not rectified, the current high rate of damaged babies is likely to continue.
Introduction
A recent report has suggested that an average claim for a
brain-damaged child is between £3.5 and £5 million and
that the incidence of hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy
(HIE) with the potential to result in one of these claims is
one to three per 1000 live births. Consequently, hospitals
with a yearly rate of 4800 deliveries may expect to have five
cases of moderate to severe HIE per year.1 Despite an
obvious moral need to reduce this rate of harm and curb
the financial drain of litigation on the NHS, it appears that
maternity trust Boards are still giving insufficient priority to
safety.2 Although previous national and regional confidenti-
ality enquiries3,4 have reported that substandard care has
been a major cause of mortality, they have lacked the
necessary in-depth investigations to identify root or under-
lying causes of errors made by staff. Similarly, it is generally
accepted that incident reporting schemes, such as that orga-
nized by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) are
subject to low levels of reporting. As there is little published
material on the underlying reasons for substandard care,5
this area is ripe for research.
This article describes research involving an in-depth
investigation to identify the root causes of 37 cases of birth
asphyxia severe enough to warrant admission to a neonatal
care unit. In 30 cases, the infants were diagnosed to have
some degree of HIE, which could result in future cerebral
palsy claims. Two infants in these cases and two others also
suffered from Erb’s palsy. Although the remaining five cases
were likely to be near-misses, they were not excluded from
the research as it is accepted that near-misses and patient
safety incidents share the same underlying causes.6
Methods
The study was undertaken by the author between February
2001 and March 2002 in the labour wards of seven maternity
units in the north-west of England. The Trusts were geo-
graphically situated to provide a range of experiences and all
complied to level one of the standards set at that time by the
Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts. With the assistance of
midwifery managers and neonatal unit staff, at least five of the
most recent admissions to the neonatal unit for severe birth
asphyxia in term infants (n ¼ 37) were selected from each unit.
All available members of staff providing care during
critical periods in these cases were interviewed using the
cognitive interviewing technique. This technique has been
shown to uncover up to 63% more information thanDr Brenda Ashcroft, Lecturer in Midwifery, University of Salford, UK
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traditional interviewing techniques,7 and the NPSA now
recommend it for use with their Root Cause Analysis
Tool.8 In total, 93 members of staff were interviewed,
including 81 midwives, two consultant obstetricians, eight
registrars and two senior house officers (SHOs).
Extensive case descriptions were generated from the
interviews, together with information contained in the case-
notes and cardiotocograph (CTG) recordings. Background
information was also provided from an observational study in
the same units the previous year, some of which has been
reported.9 An expert panel applied the Bolam test to identify
where the standard of care fell below an acceptable level. The
panel included two consultant obstetricians, a consultant neo-
natologist and neonatal midwife, a consultant midwife and a
midwifery risk manager, in addition to the researcher.
Thematic analysis was undertaken using the protocol from the
Clinical Risk Unit (CRU) and Association of Litigation and
Risk Management (ALARM) for analysing adverse
incidents.10
Results
Figure 1 shows a breakdown of the 37 cases.
When the problems arose and type of problem
Although the cases were often complex with errors occur-
ring over more than one shift, more errors occurred during
the night shift (in 19 cases, 51%). The evening shift also
involved a significant number of errors (13 cases, 35%), but
least of all occurred during the early shift (five cases, 14%).
One reason for this appeared to be the lack of adequate
on-site expert medical assistance after 17:00 hours when
the on-call system began. Delays occurred during this time
when labouring women with complications waited in turn
to be seen by the registrar (the most senior available obste-
trician), as the on-call consultant worked from home.
Midwifery staffing levels were often inadequate during
these shifts, especially during periods of sickness and holi-
days, as the unit’s staffing levels rarely ever achieved the re-
commended minimum staffing levels.9,11
Although errors often occurred during more than one
stage of labour, the majority occurred during the first stage
(in 31 cases, 84%). In 19 cases (51%), they occurred during
the second stage of labour and in 27 cases (73%) they fol-
lowed delivery. The categories of errors (Figure 2) included:
failing to respond to fetal hypoxia 26 cases (70%); undiag-
nosed obstruction 22 cases (59%), which in turn was due
to unrecognized cephalopelvic disproportion (CPD) in the
first stage of labour in 13 cases (35%); and mismanaged
shoulder dystocia during the second stage of labour in nine
cases (24%). Errors due to delays in providing adequate
infant resuscitation following delivery occurred in 26 of the
37 cases (70%). In 18 cases (49%), there was an inappropri-
ate use of Syntocinon, either due to an unwarranted or
excessive use, which caused traumatic moulding of the fetal
head in four cases of undiagnosed CPD.
Underlying causes of error
Although failing to take action, taking inappropriate or
delayed action were all due to human error, it was discovered
that they were underpinned and perpetuated by system and
cultural errors in each of the maternity units, for example
heavy workloads with an insufficient number of midwifery
staff to manage the cases safely. This occurred in 26 cases
(70%), and in 10 out of the 26 cases there was a reduction of
at least one midwife from the establishment numbers. In 10
of these 26 cases there was also a poor skill-mix (i.e. dispro-
portionate numbers of inexperienced staff). Therefore delays
occurred when complications requiring medical assistance
were either not identified or dealt with promptly. One
midwife, qualified for only six weeks and working unassisted
when a shoulder dystocia occurred, commented:
‘You’re on the main delivery unit and you’ve got an obstetric
emergency and you can’t get help.’
When such problems corresponded with occasions when
junior doctors were acting in a first on-call position for
complications or when there were restricted numbers of
medical staff available (such as during the evening and
night), delays in decision-making and providing emergency
treatment became inevitable. The difficulties facing a soli-
tary registrar and house officer during one night was
described on one occasion by a midwife:
‘The registrar had a really dreadful night. She had possibly
another two or three emergency sections. She looked absol-
utely exhausted and, was, I think, at the end of her tether.’
Support for junior midwives and midwives inexperienced
in labour ward work was not always possible during inten-
sive workloads, which was epitomized in the following
comment by a midwife qualified for one year:
‘We’ve got a lot of junior staff who need guidance. . . and
sometimes you can’t get it.’
Working beyond their level of competence and experience
without support was a common and worrying experience,
Figure 1 Outcome of 37 cases of severe birth asphyxia. Fifteen
cases involved infants with a poor prognosis (moderate or severe
hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy [HIE]); four cases HIE/poten-
tially poor prognosis (two also had Erb’s palsy); 11 cases mild HIE
or equivalent; two cases Erb’s palsy; five probable near-misses
Figure 2 Main causes of error
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illustrated by the following comment by a midwife qualified
for 15 years, but inexperienced in labour ward work,
‘It’s very scary. . . very scary for the mother and very scary for
the midwives.’
The system of care provided in the labour wards contained
cultural and hierarchical issues that provoked error in staff in 35
cases (95%). In 29 cases (78%), it occurred through a failure of
senior staff to provide assistance for junior and inexperienced
obstetricians and paediatricians. The culture also discouraged
the latter from directly seeking it through fear of being labelled
lacking in ability or not being able to cope. This also affected
registrars, for despite a clear (although not overtly voiced) need
for assistance when ringing the on-call consultant regarding
very complicated cases or excessive workloads, the latter rarely
attended during weekends and the nights. One experienced
registrar commented on his disappointment when the on-call
consultant failed to attend during a very complicated case:
‘I mean, that was a high-risk case and when I’m a consultant
I’m going to be in. If my registrar rings me up with a case
like that – I’m there.’
The position was similar for junior paediatricians, as a
midwife qualified for eight years explained:
‘The first week they’re supposed to be supervised by the
registrar, but in reality it doesn’t happen.’
Junior paediatricians were not provided with the same degree
of training in infant resuscitation as midwives and therefore
their skills and knowledge were often deficient. Despite this
fact, in 17 cases (46%) they remained unsupervised during the
birth of a severely asphyxiated infant. When they were unable
to resuscitate the child a delay occurred before the registrar’s
assistance was forthcoming. When it can be anticipated that
advanced methods of resuscitation will be required at a birth
the appropriate level of skilled practitioner should be in
attendance, but an experienced midwife (qualified for 17
years) confirmed that this was not always the case:
‘We’ve discussed having junior paediatricians with problem
cases for a long time. Very often you ‘fast bleep’ [emergency
call for senior staff] a paediatrician and somebody gets there
that can’t do any more than you can. It’s not fair to anybody.’
Communication problems regarding different practices for
summoning medical assistance were also evident in the labour
wards. One midwife qualified for two years commented:
‘I’m not really sure who to call. I think we’re supposed to call the
SHO first, but some G grades [senior midwives] call the reg.’
However, calling an SHO first often added a delay of at least
30 minutes when remedial action such as Caesarean section
was necessary. This problem was most common during the
night. One midwife qualified for two years commented on
one situation that occurred during the night:
‘You can ask the reg, but they don’t always come. They send the
SHO and tell you they’ll only come if the SHO can’t manage.’
Differences of opinion regarding what action to take were also
evident between midwives and obstetric registrars in 17 cases
(46%), with no mechanism in place to support resolution of
the dispute. One midwife qualified for three years commented:
‘You go through all this training as a midwife to be taught
this is abnormal and you’re meant to get somebody in. It’s
like you’re recognizing this is abnormal, but at the same time
the doctors are saying everything’s OK.’
The hierarchical structure operating in the labour ward
invariably resulted in midwives’ judgement being overruled,
despite some of them having more experience. As one
midwife explained:
‘I’ve been a midwife for 30 years, very often a registrar might
have been doing obstetrics for two years. You can’t compare
the two, can you?’
Despite a professional responsibility to protect the wellbeing
of those in their care,12 midwives found it difficult to
report the case to the consultant following a difference of
opinion, especially during the night. This was due to fear
of damaging the working relationship with the registrar
and/or fear of an unfavourable reaction from the consultant.
As one midwife qualified for 30 years reported:
‘It’s alright saying with hindsight you can call a consultant.
There are some that would be very sympathetic [to you], but
there are certain consultants who would haul you over the
boards for something like that.’
Another midwife, qualified for 22 years described what she
felt was the futility in doing so:
‘Some of the consultants would just say, “The registrar’s seen
her. I’m happy with that.”’
Experience and skill are vital for the safe management of
obstetric complications, yet lack of experience and gui-
dance was evident in many cases. One senior registrar com-
pared past practices with those of today, which he believed
predisposed to human error:
‘. . . the consultant used to teach how to do such things as
shoulder dystocia and the use of forceps, but that doesn’t
happen any longer. . . the junior doctors were supervised and
not just allowed to undertake things like instrumental deliv-
eries on their own.’
Lack of skill, knowledge and experience was particularly evident
with regard to signs of obstruction in the first stage of labour
resulting from either malposition or CPD. In all but one case
it resulted in inappropriate and prolonged use of Syntocinon,
causing one member of the expert panel to comment:
‘This registrar seems to want a vaginal delivery at any cost.’
When the research was being conducted the National
Sentinel Caesarean Section Audit was in progress13 and
there appeared to be a drive to reduce the number of
unnecessary Caesarean sections. Consequently, once labour
had begun many obstetricians appeared to have a reluctance
to intervene and perform Caesarean section, which con-
trasted with what appeared to be the generous provision of
Caesarean sections when planned beforehand.
In the labour wards an over-liberal use of Syntocinon
became apparent, which resulted in practitioners resorting to its
use as soon as labour became abnormal or arrested, without
first considering the underlying reasons. Failure to identify the
underlying problem and the associated dangers may be due to a
reduced emphasis on antenatal detection of CPD, which has
resulted in lowering its profile and subsequent identification.
Although it has generally been accepted that CPD can only be
diagnosed in women having a first baby following trial of
labour with adequate uterine contractions,14 in this study the
signs were poorly recognized by members of staff. In all cases
practitioners were aware that there were problems, but not pre-
cisely what they were. Diagnosis was hindered when
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inexperienced midwives and doctors were left unsupported in
charge of these cases, either during busy periods or during the
night when fewer medical staff were available. The ensuing
prolonged labours also resulted in a number of different care-
givers (both midwives and obstetricians) when the labours
occurred over more than one shift. The ‘whole picture’ conse-
quently became indistinct as the practitioners involved concen-
trated on resolving immediate problems. In these cases the
consequences for the infants were either cerebral trauma
through prolonged use of Syntocinon, excessive moulding of
the fetal skull and/or inappropriate or repeated use of instru-
ments. This resulted in one member of the expert panel to sum
up that the baby was obviously,
‘Like a square peg being pushed through a round hole.’
Inappropriate use of Syntocinon was not confined to situ-
ations involving slow progress in labour. For example, it
arose in one case of early labour in which there had been
episodes of reduced fetal movements, fetal bradycardia,
thick fresh meconium, with the CTG recording showing
reduced variability and early decelerations of the fetal heart
rate. In this case its use was clearly contraindicated, yet the
midwife reported that the consultant had ordered:
‘Start Synto and see what happens.’
In another case while awaiting the registrar following an
episode of prolonged fetal bradycardia of 66 bpm, the
midwife changed the empty bag of Syntocinon to a full one
and continued to run the infusion at a maximum rate of
96 mL/hour. Such grossly inappropriate uses of Syntocinon
led one member of the expert panel to ask in disbelief:
‘Is Synto the answer to a poor trace?’
Despite unit protocols and guidelines giving instructions
for Syntocinon regimens, none of them offered advice on
contraindications and risks, or the special precautions that
should be taken with its use. Instead, an over-familiarity
with its use appears to have led to a diminished appreciation
of the risks involved.
Conclusion
Many problems occurred through all stages of labour due to
human error, resulting in failures to take action, delays in taking
action or in taking inappropriate action. However, these were
directly initiated by such system failures as allowing unsup-
ported personnel to work in a position for which they lacked
sufficient skills, training, knowledge or experience. Such pro-
blems were encouraged by the customary practice of using
junior medical staff in a first on-call position and having
reduced medical cover during evenings and the night. This was
situated within a culture where openly seeking assistance
appeared to be frowned upon. A failure to sustain minimal mid-
wifery staffing levels similarly prevented support and guidance
being available for junior and inexperienced midwives, and
when complicated cases were managed by inexperienced and
unsupported staff, especially during heavy workloads, it resulted
in accidents waiting to happen. Such deficiencies, which allow
mistakes to occur through lack of knowledge and experience,
include the failure to detect abnormalities such as fetal hypoxia
and CPD. Mistakes were often exacerbated by erroneous and
excessive use of Syntocinon at times in an apparent effort to
achieve vaginal delivery once labour had begun. Birth hypoxia
arising from such errors was then frequently prolonged when
the least experienced personnel were sent to resuscitate these
asphyxiated infants. Such underlying causes of error highlight
an urgent need for significant changes in the system used in
labour wards. If this does not happen the high number of
damaged babies is likely to continue at the present rate.
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